February 9, 2012
Snapshot How to Engage Iran
What Went Wrong Last Time — And How to Fix It
Hossein Mousavian
HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN is an associate
research scholar at Princeton University and former spokesman for
Iran's nuclear file.
Members
of the Iranian air force re-enact Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's
arrival to Iran in 1979. (Courtesy Reuters)
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, two major schools of thought
have influenced Iran's foreign policy toward the United States. The
first maintains that Iran and the United States can reach a
compromise based on mutual respect, noninterference in domestic
affairs, and the advancement of shared interests. Those who hold this
view acknowledge the animosity and historical grievances between the
two countries but argue that it is possible to normalize their
relations. The second school is more pessimistic. It deeply distrusts
the United States and believes that Washington is neither ready nor
committed to solving the disputes between the two countries.
Having worked within the Iranian government for nearly 30 years,
and having sat on the secretariat of Iran's Supreme National Security
Council for much of the decade before 2005, I was involved in
discussions about both of these two approaches. My first personal
experience in these matters dates to the late 1980s, when the
critical issue facing the United States and Europe was the release of
Western hostages in Lebanon. During that period, Iran received dozens
of messages from Washington proposing that each side, echoing U.S.
President George H. W. Bush's 1989 inaugural address, show "goodwill
for goodwill."
That year, Bush offered then Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani a deal: If Iran assisted in securing the release of U.S.
and Western hostages in Lebanon, the United States would respond with
a gesture of its own. In response, Tehran emphasized its expectation
that the United States would unfreeze and return billions of dollars
in Iranian assets that were being held in the United States. The
Iranian leadership also came away from discussions believing that
Israel would reciprocate by releasing some Lebanese hostages,
specifically Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, the leader of Hezbollah.
Then the two schools of thought came into play. Rafsanjani
believed that this deal could be a confidence-building measure that
would lead to rapprochement with the United States. Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, warned against trusting the United
States and thought it naive to expect Washington to repay Tehran's
efforts in kind. Then, as now, he believes that the United States is
after nothing less in Iran than regime change. Ultimately, Iran
decided to play a key role in securing the release of all Western
hostages in Lebanon. But the United States neither released Iranian
assets nor facilitated the release of Lebanese hostages.
Despite the affront, in subsequent years, Ayatollah Khamenei did
not prevent Rafsanjani or, later, President Muhammad Khatami, from
making more overtures to the West. In 1997, for example, Iran
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, an agreement to
decommission all chemical weapons by 2012. The same year, it also
joined the Biological Weapons Convention. After 2001, Iran helped the
United States oust the Taliban from much of Afghanistan, and for 20
consecutive months, between 2003 and 2005, it cooperated with the
International Atomic Energy Agency. As the IAEA requested, the
government opened various military facilities to inspections,
suspended its enrichment activities, and implemented the Additional
Protocol.
Although Iran expected that these gestures would open the way for
it to continue a nuclear program (which it is authorized to do as a
signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), the United States
and the West simply developed a new set of complaints against Iran.
These included questions about Iran's nuclear-related program, its
intentions toward Israel, and its hostility toward the U.S. military
role in the region, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather than
reward Iran for cooperation, the United States implemented new
sanctions and worked to increase international pressure on Tehran.
Ayatollah Khamenei was not surprised by Washington's behavior.
Throughout this time, he routinely rejected direct talks with the
United States aimed at a rapprochement. He argued that the United
States wanted to negotiate from a position of strength; accordingly,
it employed intimidation, pressure, and sanctions to bully Iran into
submission. The West's increasingly hostile reactions to what Iran's
leaders believed were moderate policies eventually gave the radicals
the upper hand in domestic policies. And that ultimately led to the
rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Looking back, it is difficult to list all of the steps that each
side might have taken to reverse the downward spiral in relations
that followed. Certainly, the West, the United States in particular,
missed great opportunities during the moderate presidencies of
Rafsanjani and Khatami. More certainly, both sides would have needed
a stronger commitment to changing the direction of U.S.-Iran
relations.
U.S. President Barack Obama's inauguration offered an opportunity
for a new beginning. And once in office, he immediately signaled his
willingness to enter into a dialogue with the Islamic Republic on a
wide range of issues, aiming to remove 30 years of hostilities and
create "constructive ties" between the two countries. In my
view, even though the Iranian leadership was still skeptical about
Obama's ability to break many long-standing U.S. policies, it
believed in his personal intentions. For that reason, Iran's leaders
decided to test the possibility of a breakthrough by granting a freer
hand to Ahmadinejad in managing the relationship with Washington.
To be sure, much of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric about the relationship
was harsh. But Iran made some unprecedented overtures as well. As
Mohamed El Baradei, the former director of the IAEA, revealed in his
memoir, Ahmadinejad sent a message in 2009 through him offering Obama
a grand bargain. According to El Baradei, the Iranian president
expressed a desire for direct talks with the United States, which
would lead to bilateral negotiations, without preconditions. The
talks would be held on the basis of mutual respect, and Iran would
agree to help the United States in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Obama
did not respond.
Almost all Westerners blame Tehran for the decline in relations
since. They point to the failure of an initiative to swap Iran's
highly enriched uranium for less-enriched fuel rods, which Russia and
the United States proposed in Geneva in October 2009. A short time
after that meeting, the Iranian government told El Baradei that
Tehran would be willing to make the deal directly with the United
States. Washington rejected the offer. Iran subsequently signed a
similar agreement with Brazil and Turkey. That could have been an
important confidence-building measure, but the United States rejected
it, too.
In December 2010, the United States demonstrated for the first
time a readiness to recognize Iran's legitimate right to enrich
uranium for peaceful purposes. In an
interview
[1] with the BBC, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that
Iran could enrich uranium once it demonstrated that it could do so in
a responsible manner in accordance with its international
obligations. In response, Iran made new overtures toward the United
States. A reliable source told me that, during a February 2011
conference in Sweden, Iran's deputy foreign minister extended an
official invitation to Marc Grossman, the U.S. special representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to visit Iran for talks on cooperation
in Afghanistan. Washington dismissed the offer.
Then, in October 2011, Iran invited an IAEA team, led by Deputy
Director General Herman Nackaerts, to visit the research-and-
development sections of its heavy-water and centrifuge facilities. A
contact told me that during the visit, Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, the
head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, offered a blank check to
the IAEA, granting full transparency, openness to inspections, and
cooperation with the IAEA. He also
informed
[2] Nackaerts of Iran's receptiveness to putting the country's
nuclear program under "full IAEA supervision," including
implementing the Additional Protocol for five years, provided that
sanctions against Iran were lifted.
Trying to make Iran's good intentions clearer, during a trip to
New York in September 2011, Ahmadinejad announced that two American
hikers who were being held in Iranian custody would be released. He
signaled Iran's readiness to stop uranium enrichment to 20 percent if
the United States gave the country fuel rods for the Tehran Research
Reactor in return. This was an immensely important move to satisfy
some of the West's demands and demonstrate that Iran is not seeking
highly enriched uranium.
But the United States responded negatively again. Washington
accused Tehran of plotting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the
United States. It also
influenced
[3] the substance and tone of the IAEA's November report on Iran by
adding accusations of possible military dimensions to the country's
nuclear program. Last month, Washington sanctioned the Central Bank
of Iran; in effect, placed an oil embargo on the country; sponsored a
UN resolution against Iran on terrorism; and orchestrated a UN
resolution condemning Iran on human rights.
Explaining his Iran policy in New York in January, Obama proudly
announced that he had mobilized the world and built an
"unprecedented" sanctions regime targeting Iran. Obama said
U.S.-led sanctions had reduced Iran's economy to "
shambles
[4]." Three short years after the Obama administration
introduced an engagement policy, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
named Iran a "pariah state," reminding many of the previous
administration's branding of Iran as part of the "axis of evil."
Panetta
noted
[5] that he hoped Obama's new policy would weaken the regime so that
"they have to make a decision about whether they continue to be
a pariah or whether they decide to join the international community."
These statements are clear evidence that Obama's engagement policy
has failed. In fact, they support Ayatollah Khamenei's assessment
that the core goal of U.S. policy is regime change. The door to
rapprochement is closing. To keep it from slamming shut, the United
States should declare, without condition, that it does not seek
regime change in Tehran. Beyond that, the recognition of several
principles is essential to bettering U.S.-Iranian relations after
more than 30 bad years. For starters, both governments should
practice patience and try to show mutual goodwill.
For one, both the United States and Iran are eager to understand
the other's end game. Together, the two countries should draft a
"grand agenda," which would include nuclear and all other
bilateral, international, and regional issues to be discussed;
outline what the ultimate goal will be; and describe what each side
can gain by achieving it.
The United States and Iran should also work together on
establishing security and stability in Afghanistan and preventing the
Taliban's full return to power; securing and stabilizing Iraq;
creating a Persian Gulf body to ensure regional stability;
cooperating during accidents and emergencies at sea, ensuring freedom
of navigation, and fighting piracy; encouraging development in
Central Asia and the Caucasus; establishing a joint working group for
combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism; and
eliminating weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking in the
Middle East. Finally, the two countries could do much good by
strengthening the ties between their people through tourism,
promoting academic and cultural exchanges, and facilitating visas.
It would be misguided for the United States to count on exploiting
possible cleavages within the Iranian leadership. Iran's prominent
politicians have their differences -- like those in all countries --
but they will be united against foreign interference and aggression.
Both capitals should also progressively reduce threat-making, hostile
behavior, and punitive measures during engagement to prove that they
seek a healthier relationship. Engagement policy should be
accompanied by actual positive actions, not just words.
I know enough about the dangers involved in the current direction
of U.S. and Iranian policies to believe that change is essential.
There is a peaceful path -- one that will satisfy both Iranian and
U.S. objectives while respecting Iran's legitimate nuclear rights.
Washington and Tehran must find that right path together, and,
despite what passes for debate in the international arena today, I
believe they can.
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Published on
Foreign Affairs
(
http://www.foreignaffairs.com)
Links:[1]
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/12/152339.htm
[2]
http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2011/11/mousavian-interview-on-irans-nuclear-program.html?cid=6a00d83420523653ef01675f035ecb970b
[3]
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-11/10/c_122258400.htm
[4]
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gBxDdCgwUv8X2qbVyAQNwWAlP6rg?docId=CNG.88737ace4800efd85d9752c4c64d58bb.f1
[5]
http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4937